The Dominion of War: Empire and Conflict in North America 1500-2000
By Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton

(Pengun, 2005)

London Review of Books, May 19, 2005

Is the United States an empire? Only in the US could such a question even be
asked. To the rest of the world, the answer is obvious: the US is perhaps the
most powerful empire the world has known. Empire means dominion, the desire and
ability to determine the fate of peoples near and far. And in every index of
power – ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, military, economic and cultural – the US far exceeds
all other nations. It accounts for one-third of the world’s gross domestic
product and military spending. Even before the Iraq war, it had more than 700
military installations overseas. It is not surprising that in such
circumstances, many Americans feel that the country can impose its will on the
rest of the world, establishing rules of conduct for others while acting as it
sees fit.
In recent times, it has mainly been critics of the country’s foreign policy who
have spoken of an American empire. Empire has seemed distasteful, a relic of a
less enlightened era of international relations. America, George W. Bush
insisted during the 2000 election campaign, had ‘never been an empire’ and had
no intention of becoming one. Politicians still shy away from the term. But
since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the term ‘empire’ has been used without
embarrassment by political commentators in the US. The need to shoulder the
burdens of empire is now a common theme in discussions among the foreign policy
elite. Conservative writers such as Charles Krauthammer forthrightly defend
American empire as an exercise of raw power, while traditional liberals like
Michael Ignatieff promote it as a way of protecting human rights against
tyrannical regimes.
Perhaps the leading current populariser of the idea is Niall Ferguson. Only an
American empire, he insists, can secure order in a dangerous, unruly world. He
does not deny that the US is and always has been an empire. The only question
for him is whether it possesses the means to continue to act as one. His recent
book, Colossus, is a how-to manual for Americans ambivalent about the financial
and psychological costs of empire.
The idea that the US is and should be an empire has a long history, one linked
to the belief that by example, force or a combination of the two, the country
should try to remake the world in its own image. Our empire, however, was to be
different from all others. Jefferson spoke of America as an ‘empire of liberty’.
When the nation stepped onto the world stage as an imperial power in the
Spanish-American War of 1898, President William McKinley insisted that ours was
a ‘benevolent’ imperialism, that the conquest of Puerto Rico and the Philippines
ought not to be compared to the despotic actions of European powers. Woodrow
Wilson insisted that only the US possessed the combination of military power and
moral righteousness to make the world safe for democracy.
Like Ferguson, Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton begin with the premise that the
US has always been an empire. But in contrast to Ferguson’s brief, sanitised
account of US history, which leaves the impression that the country’s
territorial expansion on the North American continent took place largely through
peaceful settlement and the purchase of land, Anderson and Cayton emphasise the
centrality of military conquest.
They are nothing if not ambitious. Their aim in The Dominion of War is to
dismantle what they call the traditional ‘grand narrative’ that portrays
American history as the emergence and triumph of freedom in one nation, its
spread across the continent, and its mission to liberate the oppressed peoples
of the world. Long since abandoned, or at least severely modified, by
professional historians, this vision remains alive and well in the popular
imagination, in our public monuments and in political rhetoric. ‘Ours,’
President Bush declared in 2002, ‘is a history of freedom; freedom for
Anderson and Cayton insist that American history is a bit more complicated than
that. War, they write, has been the major ‘engine of change’ that ‘defined’
American history and created the American empire. They reject the popular idea
that Americans go to war only as a last resort, motivated by self-defence or the
desire to preserve and spread freedom rather than national aggrandisement. ‘Good
wars’, like the Revolution and World War Two, which seem to fit this model, are
memorialised in Washington, Hollywood films and national bestsellers. Anderson
and Cayton, by contrast, devote extended attention to wars for which no public
monuments exist and of which most Americans remain ignorant. These include the
war against Britain of 1812, motivated in large part by the hope of conquering
Canada and seizing land occupied by Indians east of the Mississippi; the
Mexican-American War of 1846-48, in which the United States forcibly annexed
one-third of the territory of its southern neighbour; and the Philippine War of
1899-1902, in which American troops fought a brutal struggle against insurgents
who viewed them as occupiers, not liberators.
The Dominion of War also challenges the venerable notion of American
exceptionalism. Rather than a shining city on a hill (as the Puritan settlers
believed) or the last best hope of earth (as Lincoln put it), Anderson and
Cayton see the US as a nation no different from many others. It seeks to
maximise its own power and to exercise dominion over as large an area as
possible. There is nothing distinctively American, either, in the cynical
deployment of moral arguments to justify empire. Sixteenth-century Spaniards
claimed to be ‘freeing’ Indians from backwardness and superstition. Late
19th-century Britons insisted that imperialism in Africa was inspired, in part,
by a desire to suppress slavery. There is nothing new in slogans like ‘Operation
Iraqi Freedom’.
To forge a ‘counter-narrative’ of American history, Anderson and Cayton
structure their book around a series of detailed vignettes, focused on nine
individuals. Their selection includes some familiar names, such as George
Washington and Andrew Jackson, and some surprising ones, including Samuel de
Champlain, who did more than anyone to create the French empire in 17th-century
North America, and Antonio López de Santa Anna, the Mexican leader who suffered
defeat both in the Texas War for Independence and the Mexican-American War.
Given that Anderson and Cayton are well-regarded scholars of colonial and early
national America, it is perhaps not surprising that the early chapters are the
most persuasive. They offer striking illustrations of how relations with Native
Americans powerfully shaped the origins of the American empire, and how that
empire eventually expelled or destroyed the continent’s original inhabitants.
Believing that empire could be based on ‘intercultural co-operation’ rather than
brute force, Champlain dealt with Indians on humane and relatively equal terms,
in contrast to English settlers, whose policies smacked more of apartheid than
engagement. Yet by introducing European weapons and forging military alliances
with certain Indians, Champlain set in motion events that led to persistent
warfare and the destruction of entire tribes.
No matter how benevolently conceived, empire is inherently violent and
destructive. This lesson comes through in the story of William Penn, who founded
the colony of Pennsylvania as a haven for persecuted English Quakers (and
land-hungry Europeans generally). Penn promised settlers land at low prices, and
tried to deal fairly with local Indians. But his policies were
self-contradictory. The success of his colony, not to mention his fortune,
depended on selling as much land as possible. Pennsylvania’s population doubled
every 18 years. Burgeoning white settlement inevitably meant conflict with the
Indians. By the mid-18th century, relations between Penn’s successors and
Indians had become more violent and antagonistic than in any other English
The same themes of territorial expansion and Indian subjugation inform the
chapters on George Washington, which illustrate the continuities and differences
between the British Empire and the American one created in 1776. Like the rest
of the Virginia gentry, Washington engaged actively in land speculation and did
not recognise any limit on westward expansion. (This is why the Proclamation of
1763, by which authorities in London sought to curb white settlement west of the
Appalachians, alarmed Virginians as much as British taxes that tried to make
them share the financial cost of empire.) When independence came, it produced an
‘imperial republic’ far more dangerous to the Indians than the British had been,
since its proclaimed devotion to liberty through continuous territorial
expansion required the ‘conquest and ethnic cleansing’ of the native population.
Anderson and Cayton point out that the battles of the Revolutionary War
celebrated in history books – Saratoga, Trenton, Yorktown – were accompanied by
a forgotten ‘total war’ on the frontier that led to the devastation of entire
Indian villages. Washington himself ordered that Indian communities in upstate
New York ‘be not merely overrun but destroyed’.
American independence produced a decentralised, agrarian empire, in which
liberty rested on opening up more and more land in the West while reducing the
presence of the national government in Americans’ lives. This was Jefferson’s
‘empire of liberty’. Anderson and Cayton ignore a rival conception of empire,
associated with Alexander Hamilton, that also arose in the aftermath of
independence. Hamilton believed that national greatness required the
construction of a robust central state modelled on Great Britain, with a
standing army, a powerful navy and a government tied closely to the economic
self-interest of the wealthiest Americans. Hamilton’s vision was rejected at the
time, but it has more in common with today’s American empire than Jefferson’s
agrarian republic.
Nearly half of The Dominion of War covers the colonial and revolutionary eras.
The two centuries from 1800 to the present are treated in a far more cursory
manner. Andrew Jackson exemplifies the rise of a populist, racist imperialism in
which liberty became an entitlement of white men. Ulysses S. Grant consolidates
the power of the nation-state through his victory in the Civil War, and as
president tries to reconcile ‘American power with American values’ by adopting a
‘peace policy’ towards the remaining Indians, but to no lasting effect. The
career of Douglas MacArthur illuminates the expansion of American global power
in the first half of the 20th century.
The two hundred pages allotted to the 19th and 20th centuries are too few to do
justice to the themes of warfare and empire. Anderson and Cayton’s account of
the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its aftermath, however, bears an uncanny
resemblance to today’s headlines. American leaders hailed the acquisition of the
Philippines from Spain as part of the narrative of global freedom. But when
residents of the islands rose up against the occupying forces, the American
commander, Douglas MacArthur’s father, presided over a war that involved the
torture of prisoners and horrendous civilian casualties.
After the subjugation of the Philippines, the American empire gave up
territorial conquest. Economic penetration coupled with sporadic military
intervention replaced long-term direct rule as the favoured mechanism for
exerting American power. Nonetheless, the American empire was hardly benign or
devoted to liberty. Woodrow Wilson spoke of bringing the virtues of democracy
and self-determination to the world, but during his presidency, US armies
occupied areas of Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Nicaragua and
Cuba. The aim was to protect American political hegemony and commercial
interests, but the rhetoric was that of freedom. These aims, and this rhetoric,
persist today on a global scale.
In an age of overspecialisation among historians, it is refreshing to encounter
a work that sweeps over five centuries of American history, especially one that
is readable, well researched and informed by a coherent theme and strong point
of view. But in some ways, The Dominion of War is disappointing. For one thing,
its structure is at odds with its argument. Biography is not the best vehicle
for examining the large issues with which the book grapples. The choice of
subjects is limited and sometimes difficult to understand: why only MacArthur
and, in a brief epilogue, Colin Powell from the 20th century, and why Santa Anna
at all? The biographical details are revealing but often seem unrelated to the
book’s broad themes. How crucial to the history of empire are Washington’s
preoccupation with order, Jackson’s sense of honour, Santa Anna’s womanising or
MacArthur’s relentless ambition? The biographies stress individual
decision-making and the unintended consequences of events. British victory in
the Seven Years War produced the American Revolution; territorial acquisition
from Mexico sparked the sectional controversy that led to the Civil War. But the
authors’ emphasis on ‘highly contingent events’ leaves the reader wondering
whether empire is intrinsic to the American experience or the accidental outcome
of individual idiosyncrasies.
‘What makes a book good is what you leave out,’ John Garraty once remarked.
Obviously, selection is crucial in a work that tries to cover five centuries.
But in this case, too much has been left out of the story, especially once the
book reaches the 20th century, when the US acted most forcefully as an empire on
the world stage. War, moreover, was not the only catalyst of overseas empire.
The book ignores empire’s internal roots – the quest for markets for America’s
ever-expanding industrial production, the need for raw materials, the desire for
places to invest capital. There is almost nothing about culture and ideology as
sources of imperial power. In general, the US is treated as an undifferentiated
imperial unit, expanding first on the North American continent and then
internationally, with little attention to internal divisions, including
divisions over the wisdom and morality of empire itself.
Perhaps the most glaring omission is any consideration of the centrality of
slavery to the first 250 years of the American experience. The authors seem to
view slavery as little more than an obstacle to the national unity necessary for
the full realisation of the country’s imperial ambitions. But colonial America
was part of a slave-based empire. After independence, slavery spurred
expansionism and gave American nationality a distinct racial cast.
African-Americans are almost entirely absent from this story – at least until
the final pages, when Colin Powell makes a brief appearance to illustrate how
the Vietnam War affected thinking about the country’s role in the world.
Still, Anderson and Cayton deserve praise for their call for Americans to think
about their history in terms of power as well as freedom. Current imperial
policies, they suggest, do not result from the machinations of the president and
a small group of malevolent advisers, but have deep roots in the American
experience. Greater knowledge of the idea and practice of empire might help
Americans understand why other nations resent our penchant for pursuing our own
interests as a world power while proclaiming that we embody universal values.
The Dominion of War offers a valuable reminder that the benevolence of
benevolent imperialism lies in the eye of the beholder. Indians and Mexicans did
not choose to surrender their land to the onward march of the empire of liberty.
Filipinos and Puerto Ricans did not necessarily share the judgment that they
were better off under American rule than as independent nations. As we watch
from our living-rooms the progress of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is worth
remembering Anderson and Cayton’s observation that most American wars have been
fought ‘less to preserve liberty than to extend the power of the United States
in the name of liberty’.
The Dominion of War might be read alongside J.M. Coetzee’s novel Waiting for the
Barbarians. Coetzee’s protagonist, a well-intentioned petty bureaucrat living on
the imperial frontier, develops a passionate hatred for a brutal official sent
from the centre to extract information about a local insurgency. He comes to
understand that the torturer and the humanitarian are both intrinsic to the
practice of empire. ‘I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent
pleasure-loving opposite of the cold, rigid colonel. I was the lie that Empire
tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when the harsh
winds blow. Two sides of imperial rule, no more, no less.’ Empire is a way not
of protecting democracy and human rights, but of destroying them.
‘Republic or empire?’ This was the central question of the presidential contest
of 1900 between William McKinley, the proponent of benevolent imperialism, and
William Jennings Bryan, who viewed empire as incompatible with democracy, at
home as well as abroad. At least McKinley and Bryan were candid about what was
at stake. In the 2004 campaign, empire was the idea that dared not speak its
name. Bush repudiated the word while pursuing the policy. Kerry offered, in
effect, empire with a human face. By a small majority, the American people chose
the unalloyed version. The question now is whether the rest of the world will
consent to live as its subjects.